Chase Carey Told the New York Story; F1's Real Document Is Miami 2041 and Las Vegas 2037
**मुख्य उत्तर**: फ़ॉर्मूला वन ने 2017 के बाद अमेरिका में तीन शहरों को लक्षित किया — मियामी, लास वेगास और न्यूयॉर्क। पूर्व CEO चेज़ केरी के अनुसार न्यूयॉर्क को व्यवहारिक रूप से असंभव माना गया, इसलिए केवल मियामी (2022) और लास वेगास (2023) की दौड़ें शुरू हुईं। **मुख्य तथ्य**: - चेज़ केरी ने न्यूयॉर्क के Autosport Business Exchange पैनल पर कहा कि न्यूयॉर्क उन तीन अमेरिकी शहरों में था जिन्हें F1 ने लक्षित किया। - केरी ने कहा कि न्यूयॉर्क को "वास्तविक रूप से" ऐसा माना गया जो होने वाला नहीं है; रिपोर्ट में कारण नहीं दिया गया। - मियामी ग्रां प्री का होस्टिंग अनुबंध कम से कम 2041 तक और लास वेगास का 2037 तक चलता है। - केरी के अनुसार F1 के करीब 300 पार्टनर हैं, जिनमें आधे से ज़्यादा अमेरिका में हैं; "पार्टनर" की परिभाषा नहीं दी गई। - क्रिश्चियन हॉर्नर ने रेड बुल छोड़ने के बाद पहली अमेरिकी सार्वजनिक उपस्थिति इसी व्यावसायिक पैनल पर दर्ज कराई। **स्रोत**: Autosport की रिपोर्ट, Autosport Business Exchange (न्यूयॉर्क), प्रकाशन फरवरी 2026। **संबंधित प्रश्न-उत्तर**: प्रश्न: क्या अमेरिका में चौथी F1 रेस हो सकती है? उत्तर: व्यावसायिक रूप से यह कठिन है, क्योंकि 24-रेस कैलेंडर में मियामी (2041) और लास वेगास (2037) के अनुबंध दो स्लॉट जमा चुके हैं और किसी नई मेज़बानी के लिए किसी मौजूदा रेस को हटाना पड़ेगा। प्रश्न: लास वेगास ग्रां प्री का प्रोमोटर कौन है? उत्तर: लास वेगास में प्रोमोटर स्वयं फ़ॉर्मूला वन है, यानी लिबर्टी मीडिया के स्वामित्व वाली इकाई, जिससे होस्टिंग फ़ीस का राजस्व लुप्त होकर पूरा इवेंट जोखिम F1 के खाते में आ जाता है। प्रश्न: चेज़ केरी का न्यूयॉर्क ख़ुलासा कितना नया है? उत्तर: यह एक ऐतिहासिक पुष्टि है, क्योंकि केरी ने स्वयं कहा कि न्यूयॉर्क को असंभव माना गया था, इसलिए यह किसी सक्रिय योजना का संकेत नहीं है।
At a business panel in New York, 72-year-old Chase Carey said one sentence that became the headline: New York was one of three US cities Formula 1 targeted for its American expansion, alongside Miami and Las Vegas. On the same stage he said something else, which most headlines dropped — that New York was "realistically recognised as not going to happen." A city that never lost a race is now entry number three in a former CEO's recollection, and no contract ever recorded it.
This is not a racing story. It is an option-value story. A race that never happened still leaves a line in the accounts, and to read that line you need the contract, not the headline. The hardest document in this report is not New York. It is Miami's 2041 and Las Vegas's 2037.
Context: what Liberty bought in January 2026 was a market, not a race
Liberty Media completed its takeover of Formula 1 in January 2026 — roughly $4.4bn for the equity, an enterprise value near $8bn. When Carey became CEO, F1's entire American map was one race: Austin, first held in 2026. Coverage had moved to ESPN, ratings were climbing slowly, but the world's largest advertising market hosting a single round was the clearest hole in Liberty's investment case.
Carey told the panel that US growth was "a priority from day one" and that Miami and Las Vegas became "a building block" of that plan. Both are now on the calendar — Miami from May 2026, Las Vegas from November 2026. Carey ran F1 from 2026 to 2026; Stefano Domenicali took over in January 2026. The strategy being described is the strategy of the man describing it. Useful information, not independent evaluation.
Core: three cities, three promoter models, three balance sheets
America's three races are not the same product. The biggest difference is not track layout. It is whose balance sheet carries the risk.
Austin: promoter's risk, promoter's upside. The Circuit of the Americas is a private promoter's project, supported by Texas's Major Events Reimbursement Program to the reported tune of roughly $25m a year. F1 collects a hosting fee; ticketing, sponsorship and local economic risk sit with the promoter.
Miami: real estate's risk, racing's upside. The Miami International Autodrome sits inside the Hard Rock Stadium campus, promoted by South Florida Motorsports — the Stephen Ross and Related system. The circuit's most expensive asset already existed. The promoter built the track; F1 sold the sanction.
Las Vegas: F1's own risk, F1's own upside. This is the third model and the least discussed. In Las Vegas the promoter is F1 itself, a Liberty-owned entity. Building a pit complex and grandstands for a Saturday night race on the Strip required capital; the land purchase in West Harmon was reported at around $240m, with the full event build running into the hundreds of millions. F1 did not collect a promoter's fee here. It took the promoter's role.
That third model changes the quality of the revenue. Where F1 promotes its own race, the hosting fee disappears from the ledger and the event's entire P&L lands in F1's consolidated accounts. A hosting fee is contracted and forecastable; ticketing and hospitality are market-dependent. Las Vegas gave F1 its biggest American stage and its largest single-event exposure in the same transaction.
Core: why New York did not happen — and why the report does not say
Carey's claim is that at that point only New York, Miami and Las Vegas made sense, because they were "iconic locations that wow people," and New York was realistically written off. That is where the report leaves its largest gap: no reason is given. Land, permits, resident opposition, circuit layout, funding — none appear in the text.
The gap looks familiar, because the record contains a precedent. In the early 2010s a Grand Prix was scheduled for Port Imperial in Weehawken, New Jersey, for June 2026. It never happened. Permits, local objection and financing terms stalled it. The binding constraint on an American street race has never been appetite; it has always been permission to close a city. In Manhattan the scale is different: crossing the Hudson, shutting Midtown, and persuading residents with no stake in the deal to surrender their streets for four days.

That is inference, not text. But when a former CEO says a city was "not going to happen" and offers no cause, the reporter's job is to chase the cause, not polish the sentence.
Core: 2041 and 2037 — two calendar slots have been frozen
The most important fact in the report sits at the end of it. Miami's hosting agreement runs to at least 2041. Las Vegas runs to 2037. Austin is long established.
Now do the arithmetic. The calendar is 24 races. Miami and Las Vegas have blocked two slots for the next 12 to 17 years. Two of 24 slots are contracted for a generation, and that directly reduces the bargaining power of every aspirant or displaced venue.
The consequence runs in three directions. Aspiring markets in Africa and Asia lose the "empty slot" argument, because there is no empty slot. Rotation — the model of alternating European rounds that has circulated in recent years — cannot apply to the United States, because the contracts do not permit it. And FOM's own optionality narrows: a 17-year deal buys revenue certainty and pays for it with future freedom.
This is where I read the ledger first and the press release second. Contract duration tells you what a company actually bought. A long term means certainty was worth more at the time. Seen from today, it is the deal that will weigh heaviest if the US market cools.
Core: "about 300 partners, more than half US-based" — a number that needs a definition
Carey said F1 has roughly 300 partners, more than half based in the US. It was presented as strength. I log it as a data-quality flag.
In paddock usage, "partner" means the 20 to 30 official sponsors. Three hundred does not fit that definition. It probably aggregates licensees, promoters, broadcasters, hospitality clients, suppliers and team-level agreements. Until the definition is stated, the figure works in a slide and not in a balance sheet.
Even after the definition, one point survives. If more than half the commercial base sits in a single national advertising market, that is not diversification; it is correlation risk. In a US advertising downturn the number stops being strength and becomes concentration. Carey frames it as growth. In ledger language it is the same exposure every club saw in its matchday line in 2026.
Core: the real story is in paragraph seven, and it is not Carey
A more commercially significant sentence sits further down the piece: Christian Horner made his first US appearance since leaving Oracle Red Bull Racing, and he made it on a business exchange stage, not a technical forum. Beside him were GM's Mark Reuss, Penske's Jonathan Gibson, NASCAR's Tim Clark and Jimmie Johnson.
That is not a signal of a return to racing. It is a signal of executive talent circulating in the commercial layer. A championship-winning team principal, months after leaving his team, standing on a New York commercial stage is the footprint of an executive market, not a pit wall. It is the most useful signal in the report, because principal movement is no longer settled inside a garage; it is settled in sponsor and promoter meetings.
Mark Reuss's presence is a second signal. With Cadillac entering in 2026, GM sitting inside F1's commercial ecosystem is logical. The report does not mention Cadillac or 2026, so that linkage is my inference, not its fact.
The third signal is the stage itself. F1, NASCAR and IndyCar-Penske on one panel is co-opetition: three series drawing from the same American sponsor pool and the same broadcast attention, sharing a platform.
Contrarian: what the headline sold and what the text said
The headline says a third US city was "targeted." The text says it was assessed as unworkable. Those are different things, and the difference matters in a negotiation. An option never exercised is not a pipeline; it is a closed file. Read it as a historical footnote, not news — and the headline as a click-optimised rewrite of that footnote.
Second, "only three made sense at that point" is an argument made after the fact. The man who made the decision is rationalising it once the outcome is known. The record includes the New Jersey attempt, which this report does not. When a former executive says only three options existed, he is converting the limits of his own decision into history.
Third, and this is my central disagreement: the long contracts are being presented as an achievement when they are a trade. Seventeen years of certainty costs seventeen years of flexibility. A series still growing needs optionality, not certainty, because the market it is growing in is also its largest concentration. If American interest softens over the next decade, the same contracts that look like strength today will demand an exit route. The report does not disclose whether exit clauses exist. That is the real question, and it is unanswered.
Fourth, the most telling detail is who told the story: a former CEO, not the current one. A sitting leadership that wanted to reopen the option would be the one disclosing it. A dead option gets revealed only when nobody intends to revive it. Commercially, the story is excellent scarcity marketing for the two live races — an "iconic" alternative existed and was declined, so what was chosen must be better.
Takeaway: three documents to watch
I covered Force India's administration from the High Court steps in London in 2026. The lesson holds: when the document opens, the story stops being a rumour. There is no document on New York. There is one on Miami and Las Vegas, and that is the actual text of this story.
Three things to watch. First, the post-2026 Concorde and calendar governance framework — the terms on which the 24-race cap opens will decide whether a fourth US round is ever a live question. Second, whether the Las Vegas model is exported: F1 promoting its own races. If it is, the series' revenue base shifts from fee-based toward event-risk-based, and that reaches every team's payout. Third, the US advertising cycle.
One question is left open, and no file currently answers it: if the American market cools over the next decade, whose balance sheet carries a contract running to 2041 — the promoter's, FOM's, or the team that is already budgeting against that revenue? Until that answer arrives, the New York story is a good story. The ledger still sits on 2041.
